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Abstract
Using the institutional set-up of the Norwegian cement industry, in particular
its sharing rule, we are able to identify the workings of a cartel in some detail.
Given data on prices, production, and exports, we are able to identify marginal
costs as well as the eﬀectiveness of the cartel. We compare our marginal cost
estimates, which are derived from an equilibrium condition, to detailed cost ac-
counting data, and find that our estimate of marginal cost is very much in line
with the data. We then show that the cement cartel has been ineﬀective in the
sense that the sharing rule induces ”overproduction” and exporting below mar-
ginal costs. In this sense it is consumers, not firms, that benefit from the sharing
rule. We find that the ineﬀectiveness of the cartel is becoming so large that do-
mestic welfare of a merger to monopoly would in fact be positive at around 1968,
which is exactly when the merger actually took place! However, we also show
that competition would have resulted in even higher welfare gains over the entire
sample.
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1 Introduction
There are relatively few empirical studies on the workings of a cartel. The primary
reasons for this is that cartels are often illegal and therefore data are diﬃcult to obtain.
Even though antitrust agencies sometimes achieve detailed information on cartels, strict
confidentiality rules often keep data from academic research. A notable exception is
the seminal work by Porter (1983), which investigates price wars in a railroad cartel
operating in U.S. in the late 19th century.1 More recently Genesove and Mullin (1998)
use data from 1892 to 1914 of the American sugar industry, where the American Sugar
Refining Company controlled (through acquisition) 95% of the US sugar market by 1895.
Finally, the so-called Lysine cartel, an industry producing feed additive used to ensure
the proper growth of livestock, has provided more information on the workings of cartels
international settings (see Griﬃn, 2001).2
Most empirical studies on cartels focus on markets where a known cartel exists and
investigate the ability of the cartel to keep a collusive agreement in place, that is, on
the cartel’s eﬀorts to prevent individual members from cheating on the agreement3. By
contrast, there are few empirical studies that focus explicitly on the problem of the
eﬀectiveness of a particular cartel agreement, such as the choice of a sharing rule, which
determines how the monopoly rents are divided up amongst the members.
This paper studies the eﬀectiveness of a cartel. By eﬀectiveness, we mean the ability
of a legal cartel to achieve profit maximization in light of a particular sharing rule. Given
the legality of the Norwegian Cement Cartel, we have a large amount of primary data
allowing us to do a complete welfare analysis. Using the unique institutional set-up of
the Norwegian cement industry, in particular its sharing rule, we are able to identify
the workings of a cartel in some detail. Taking these institutional factors into account,
we focus on the two fundamental problems that a cartel faces: deciding on domestic
quantity as well as on the distribution of rents4. Given data on domestic and world
1See also Green and Porter (1984) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986).
2The cartel was in place for the period 1992 to 1995 and was fined on the order of $100 million plus
personal fees and prison sentences for some of the employees. To expose the cartel the FBI used covert
cameras to tape cartel meetings, providing us with detailed information on the workings of the Lysine
cartel.
3See for example Levenstein (1997) for a historical study of the stability of cartels looking at the pre
World War I Bromine industry. Genesove an Mullins (2001) discuss how rules and frequent meetings
prevented unnecessary retaliations among the sugar cartel members and how they maintained a collusive
price level. See also McCutcheon (1997) for a discussion on the importance of information sharing in
cartels. Suslow (1988) provides a comprehensive list of diﬀerent cartels that were active in the inter-war
period.
4Osborne (1976) in a seminal contribution refers to these two problems as "the sharing problem"
and the "locate the contract surface" problem. He also mentions "detection" and "deterrence" as two
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market prices, production, and exports, we use a simple model to identify marginal
costs, which in turn allows us to study the eﬀectiveness of the cartel and its impact on
consumers and welfare.
The Norwegian cement industry was cartelized in 1923. Our empirical analysis is
based on available data for the cartel period of 1955-1968. In 1968, the three firms that
had formed the cartel merged to monopoly. In addition to the cartel period (1955-1968),
we also have data for the subsequent monopoly period from 1968-1982.
Coordination of the cartel’s activities was achieved through the common sales oﬃce
A/S Portland cementkontor and various other cross industry information sharing and
coordination institutions as Norwegian Cementforening. In principle the cartel has to
decide on the total amount of cement that is sold domestically and on a sharing rule,
which determines how the rent is split up amongst the cartel members. In this paper
- motivated by the Norwegian case - we study a particular sharing rule that appears
to be rather reasonable from the cartel’s point of view: the cartel decides to reward
domestic market shares based on the members’ share of total production (i.e. exports
plus domestic sales). An important aspect of the cartel’s sharing rule was that total pro-
duction (or capacity) was not restricted. Whenever total domestic production exceeded
the domestic sales set by the common sales oﬃce, the excess output was exported at
current world market price.
Following this institutional set-up of the Norwegian cement industry, we consider
the decisions of the members of the cartel in a simple two-stage analysis. First, each
cartel member decides on how much capacity to install, taking the sharing rule into
account. That is, each member’s domestic quota is based on the member’s share of total
Norwegian production. Second, the cartel collectively decides (through the common
sales oﬃce) on how much of total production to allocate to the domestic market.
As we will see below, this sharing rule will create an incentive to ”overproduce” and
export (even when marginal costs are above the world market price), since each member
of the cartel increases their share of the domestic rent. This overproduction reduces
the cartel’s eﬀectiveness in the sense of lowering profits to the cartel. Moreover, we will
show that the eﬀectiveness crucially depends on the world market price. Since the world
market price represents the opportunity costs of not exporting, the common sales oﬃce
maximizes the cartel’s profits by equating marginal domestic revenue with the world
market price5. As a result, a lower world market price implies that the cartel allocates
more production to the domestic market, which reduces the cartel’s domestic rents (to
further internal cartel problems. The last two are unlikely to play a role in the Norwegian cement
industry. See also Eswaran (1996) for a study on cartel unity in the face of business cycle eﬀects.
5We assume that the world cement price is exogenous, which is reasonable for a country like Norway.
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the benefit of domestic consumers).
Methodologically, the main contribution is the way in which we identify marginal
costs, which is the basis for our complete welfare analysis. This paper uses a structural
approach to study this industry. As usual, the structural approach does not rely on
direct cost data, but rather infers marginal costs from an equilibrium condition. To add
credibility to the structural estimates of marginal costs, we then compare our estimates
to separate accounting data on costs. Using rather detailed cost accounting data (such as
cost data on wages, electricity and material inputs) we are able to compare our estimate
of marginal cost with an accounting cost index. The results are very encouraging, in the
sense that accounting evidence is strongly supporting our structural estimate.
By contrast the paper by Steen and Sørgard (1999), which also investigates the
Norwegian cement industry, is a reduced form analysis. They do not use an explicit
equilibrium model to identify marginal costs. As a result of the equilibrium approach,
we are able to provide also a complete welfare analysis and study the workings of a cartel
in some detail.
There are a number of related papers that have studied the set-up that is present in
the Norwegian cement industry. Davidson and Deneckere (1990) - look at a game where
firms tacitly collude on price, but compete in capacity. Building on work by Benoit and
Krishna (1987) they show that equilibria exist where firms will carry excess capacity in
order to support collusive outcomes (see also Osborne and Pitchik (1987)). They do not
explain as to why firms can not collude in capacity, but rather cite a number of examples
of where firms are in such a situation of "semi-collusion" (or as it is also called "mixed
games", see Brander and Harris (1984)). They also state that "it is well-known that
even in cases of overt collusion (such as the German Cement cartel in the 1920s and
1930s, or the Texas oil industry in the 1930s) firms find it exceedingly diﬃcult to collude
in capacities - emphasis added" (see Davidson and Deneckere p.523). Scherer (1980, pp.
370-71) writes that "In Germany during the 1920s and 1930s, shares were allocated on
the basis of production capacity. Cartel members therefore raced to increase their sales
quotas by building more capacity".
Given its empirical relevance, this paper provides some evidence on the workings of
the incentive to "overinvest" in capacity. Our empirical findings are as follows. The
cement cartel has been ineﬀective in the sense that the sharing rule induces ”overpro-
duction” and exporting (below marginal costs). We further show that the ineﬀectiveness
of the sharing rule is increasing over time, that is consumers benefit more (relative to
monopoly), while producers are loosing both domestically as well as in the export mar-
ket. In this sense it is consumers, not firms, that benefit from the sharing rule. Finally,
we find that the ineﬀectiveness of the cartel is becoming so large that domestic welfare
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of a merger to monopoly would in fact be positive at around 1968, which is exactly when
the merger actually took place! Insofar our results suggest that the merger to monopoly
took place exactly when a benevolent domestic dictator - ignoring adjustment costs -
would have merged.
We conclude, however, by stating that there was another alternative to an outright
merger, namely competition (a la Cournot). While the merger yields positive welfare
gains after 1968, we show that competition would have resulted in considerably higher
welfare gains over the entire sample. In this sense, the merger which took place in 1968
is only second best.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin by presenting the Norwegian cement
industry and the cement cartel. We then discuss sharing rules more generally. Section 4
presents the model and some useful comparative statics. The empirical implementation
and results are presented in Section 5. Concluding remarks are in Section 6.
2 The Norwegian Cement Industry
The Norwegian cement cartel has several features and institutional arrangements that
allow us to learn more about the workings of cartels. There are relatively few empirical
contributions on Cartels, which is not due to lack of interest, but rather lack of data.
Given the legality of the Norwegian Cement Cartel, we have a large amount of primary
data allowing us to do a complete analysis of the eﬀects of the Norwegian cartel6
The first Norwegian cement plant, A/S Christiania Portland Cementfabrikk (CPC)
was established in 1892.7 At the end ofWorldWar I, three new plants were established in
Norway: A/S Dalen Portland-Cementfabrikk (DPC) in 1916, CE-NO Portland Cement
6In addition to annual reports from Christiania Portland Cementfabrikk and NORCEM, we have a
detailed industry history written by Gartmann (1990) and business knowledge from sources as Lorange
(1973).
7The technology in this industry was gradually improving over the sample period in Norway. A
cement kiln is built as a tubelike oven, and the kiln’s production capacity is primarily determined by
the length of the ”tube”. In the beginning a kiln would be in the order of 20-30 meters long, whereas
the newest kilns installed after 1965 was several hundred meters long. In 1920 an eﬃcient rotary kiln
produced 50 000 tonnes annually. After the second world war the corresponding amount was 150 000
tonnes, whereas in 1966 and 1967 the largest kilns at Dalen and Slemmestad produced 500 000 tonnes
each. The technology also changed from ”wet process” to ”dry process” over this period, where the
newer ”dry process” was more eﬃcient and required less energy. The enormous new kilns that are in use
today have a capacity of more than 1 million tonnes per kiln, but none of these where installed in our
sample period. Gradually expansion of kiln size together with the fact that older kilns only gradually
where phased out as they got non profitable made therefore the technology improvement relatively
smooth in Norway.
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A/S in 1917 and a firm in Northern Norway, Nordland Portland Cementfabrikk A/S
(NPC) in 1918. The capacity expansion, combined with the recession in Norway from
1920, led in the early 20s to a domestic capacity amounting to almost twice the domestic
demand [see Gartmann (1990; 114)]. The mismatch between capacity and demand
triggered a price war and later the establishment of A/S Norsk Portland Cementkontor
in 1923, a joint sales oﬃce for the three firms in Southern Norway (CPC, DPC and
CE-NO). Five years later, NPC became a member of the common sales oﬃce as well.
CE-NO was acquired by DPC in 1927 (see Gartmann, 1990), which increased DPCs
market share to the level of CPC.
The Norwegian cement industry has been cartelized through the common sales of-
fice since 1923. The reasons for the creation of the sales oﬃce was clearly to remove
competition: “both companies (in the south) had to sacrifice something on the alter of
collaboration. The sales oﬃce primary task was to organize the sale in a better way, to
prevent cross-transportation and unprofitable competition. A/S Norsk Portland Cemen-
tkontor took care of the sale for both factories [CPC and DPC]. Later [1928] also the
Northern firm’s sales [NPC]were included trough a common sales agent in Trondheim.”
(Gartmann, 1990 p. 46). This implied that from 1928 all cement was sold trough one
agency, and no cement was sold directly from the factories. In particular, the common
sales oﬃce determined the total domestic sale and sets domestic quotas according to
each firm’s total capacity. In other words, the Norwegian cartel used a sharing rule
whereby the domestic market was divided according to each member’s total capacity
(domestic production plus exports)8.
After establishing the common sales oﬃce, more institutional ties were developed. In
1927, “Norsk Cementforening (NC)” was founded. NC was an institution (funded by the
industry) that coordinated standards, lobbied government committees, and took part
in the education of engineers and cement workers. Gartmann (1990 p.47) claims that
“the sales oﬃce and NC, were forerunners to the full merger in 1968. Norcem came to
a finished table arrangement with coordinated sales and information already established
over a long period”. In the beginning only the two big producers in the south joined
NC, but later also the northern firm entered 9.
8As long as prices are higher than short run marginal cost (which is the case, see below) it is optimal
to use all the installed capacity such that capacity equals production. Storage is not an option either,
due to limited storage capacity for cement. In the annual report from NORCEM in 1968 we could read
(p.9): ”Because the capacity for storing finished cement is so small, production has to conform quite
closely to sales.” The sharing rule can thus also be considered a production sharing rule.
9The cement producers started several other institutions as they moved into downstream activities.
For instance, the production of cement products as tubes and panels had their own body, called “The
Cement producers price co-ordination body” that was founded in 1928, whose task was to “collaborate
5
As we mentioned above, the common sales oﬃce and the sharing rule will create
an incentive to export. Let us look at exports. The three firms’ exports fell gradually
during the 30s, from more than 50% of total domestic production to approximately 10%
of domestic production at the beginning of World War II. In the mid 50s exports grew
rapidly, and in the late 60s over 40% of the domestic production was exported. In 1968
the three firms merged and established the firm Norcem, and during the 70s Norcem
closed down the excess capacity.
Norwegian exports predominantly went to non-European markets, such as South-
and North-America, as well as Africa. The reason why little cement was exported to
other European countries has been explained through a retaliation game. Essentially,
competition is a multi-market game where credible threats to enter each others markets
prevent firms form entering other countries (see for example Röller and Friederiszick
(2003)). Aiginger and Pfaﬀermayr (1997) undertake a study of the competition in the
cement and paper industries. On page 252 they state that: “the cement industry is faced
with limited geographical competition”. Later they say that: “we are confident that the
EU is the relevant geographic market for the paper industry, for cement this is clearly
not the case” (p.263). As a result, Norwegian exports went to non-European markets in
order to prevent possible retaliation from neighboring European countries.
Let us now look at imports. A further implication of the European stale-mate was
that there were little imports (at least from other European countries) into Norway. In
addition, there were also few imports from other parts of the world. The reason for
this was that the domestic market was protected both by high tolls and by relatively
high transport costs. For instance, in 1959 the toll was 8 NOK per ton. This was
approximately 9% of the factory price. CPC considered this a significant toll barrier.
(CPC annual report 1959 p. 4). It is therefore no surprise that imports were low.10 In
addition, there was a relative high transport cost to Norway, primarily due to the trade
on prices and rebates to prevent non serious producers to enter the market “ (Gartmann, 1990, p.
62). In the same fashion NC controlled that the local concrete mixers, which were small firms often
organized in local oligoplolies produced according to quality standards. In 1964 these firms founded a
collaboration body: “ The local concrete-mixers institute”. The institute however had its secretariat
in the same oﬃces as NC, suggesting that NC played a rather influential role in co-ordination of the
cement industry during the cartel period.
10To the extent that we saw imports it was small and typically seasonal — in some periods more cement
then what was produced was needed. “To cover the max-consumption during the fall season there was
an import of 32 000 tonnes of cement . . . and as usual in addition to this some minor quantities of
special cement that is not produced in Norway was imported” (CPC-annual report 1959 p.3) In 1959
total production was 1103 000 tonnes, suggesting an import less then 3%. The export in this year was
80 000 tonnes, so Norway was a net exporter also in 1959. Note that the overproduction in 1959 was
small compared to what we saw develop during the 60s.
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pattern at this time period. Norwegian boats had excess capacity for bulk transport
leaving Norway, depressing transport prices out of Norway (some minimum ballast is in
fact needed for oversea journeys). By contrast, for coming back to Norway there was
plenty of cargo from ports in the US, Latin America11 and Africa. As a result, transport
costs to Norway were considerably more expensive (Gartmann, 1990).
In sum, there has been little import of cement into Norway and most of the exports
have been to non-European countries. Given that Norway is a very small producer on
the (non-European) world market, we will assume below that the (non-European) world
market price for cement is exogenous to the cartel decision problem.
This paper will focus on the large capacity built up after 1955. We will argue that
this is due to ”overproduction” stemming from the common sales oﬃce and the sharing
rule. As we have mentioned above, the common sales oﬃce existed since 1923. However,
prior to the 1950’s, firms had to ask the government for permission to undertake capacity
investments. The reason for this was that imports of technology to undertake capacity
expansions were rationed, due to shortages after World War II. As rationing was ended,
the regulation of capacity was also ended by the mid 1950’s. We would therefore expect
the "overproduction" to emerge only in the mid 1950’s.
Let us take a first look at the data. Figure 1 shows domestic production and domestic
consumption of cement for the period 1955 to 1968. As can be seen, the first year where
production was higher than consumption was 1956, with export practically zero. From
1956 to 1968 production increased by 150%, whereas the Norwegian consumption only
increased by 50%. By 1968 this lead to an export of some 828 000 tonnes, almost as
much as Norway’s total production in 1955. There is thus rather striking evidence that
overproduction took place.
[Figure 1 approximately here]
As we have mentioned above, this paper will focus on the sharing rule and its in-
centives to explain the above phenomenon. What about alternative explanations? In
principle, there may be two other reasons for the observed capacity increase (see also
Steen and Sørgard (1999)): the Norwegian producers built up such high capacity levels
due to unrealistically high anticipation of increased future demand, or to deter entry.
Let us take these alternative explanations in turn.
Regarding the unanticipated demand slowdown, the CPC undertook a very compre-
hensive and detailed ten year forecast of Norwegian cement consumption in 1957 (annual
11For instance, Norway imported large quantites of Bauxit from Latin America for the Norwegian
aluminium industry.
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CPC-report 1958 pp.14-28), including a number of diﬀerent economic and demographic
trends (such as fertility, household size, average number of rooms per house, building
and construction trends, GNP, population growth). Comparing the 1957 forecast with
actual realized demand, one finds that the forecast was rather accurate with a margin
of error below 5% (except for 1959). The forecast for 1967 (made in 1957) predicted a
Norwegian consumption of 1.35 million tonnes, while the actual consumption in 1967
was 1.358 million tonnes! It appears that the industry’s ability to predict future domes-
tic demand was exceedingly good, making an argument for a dramatic capacity built-up
based on optimistic demand expectations implausible. If entry deterrence was the mo-
tive for over production, we should have expected other European countries to have
a similar capacity expansion at that time, as they would have had the same strategic
incentives to deter entry. As can be seen in Figure 2 the built-up in other European
countries was much later.
[Figure 2 approximately here]
We therefore conclude that the incentives created by the cartel’s sharing rule is the
most plausible explanation for the large capacity investments in Norway.
Given the incentives created by the sharing rule in the mid 1950’s, one may wonder
why the firms did not merge earlier than 1968. A reasonable explanation are the
existence of other institutional agreements that have been agreed on a long-term basis.
In particular, the firms entered into two long-term agreements in 1957 and 1962. In
these contracts the firms were tied even stronger together. “When the industrial firms
start a market collaboration is it natural that this lead to increased contact and exchange
of views also within other fields of the firms activities. In the cement industry this lead
to an extension of the collaboration, both with regards to particularities and more general
issues. Common purchases, standards of cement types, common packaging was agreed
upon. This was particular formalized in the agreement of 1957, and even more so with
the revision of the agreement in 1962.” (Gartmann, 1990 p. 115). CPC themselves
described the agreement in their annual report (1962 p. 7) as “An agreement that has
as main object to govern a good collaboration between the cement factories to obtain
a rational solution of the industry’s production and distribution tasks”. Interestingly
enough the 1962 agreement that was denoted as “the 7 year agreement” lasted until
December 31, 1968. Hence, the merger in 1968 came at a time where either a new
market agreement had to be negotiated, or an alternative industry structure. As losses
from exporting where mounting up (as we will show below) and other agreements were
running out in 1968, a merger to monopoly was ultimately implemented.
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Another factor allowing a merger to monopoly in 1968 was that antitrust concerns
vis-à-vis the merger were unlikely to be significant in Norway at that time, as an eﬀective
merger control did not exist and consumers did not play much of a role in competition
concerns12. The general view at the time was that all mergers were good. As a result,
there was no visible opposition against the NORCEM merger in 196813.
3 Sharing rules in practice
The Norwegian cartel was subject to a very formal agreement where the market sharing
rule was implemented with rigor. This can be illustrated by the fact that CPC and DPC
implemented side payments to adjust for sales that were in excess of the firms’ domestic
market share. The background for this was that DPC had better export facilities (such
as port loading technology). This need for these market divisions and organization of the
exports was bluntly stated by the industry: ”CPC’s deliveries to its ordinary, domestic
market increased from 464.000 tonnes in 1963 to 484.000 tonnes in 1964. In addition, it
delivered 54.000 tonnes to DPC’s customers, which implied that DPC’s export increased
with an identical amount. For this indirect export, CPC compensated DPC according
to the ordinary export prices.” (p. 13). There are several similar statements in other
annual reports.14
There are other examples of similar sharing rules that have been used by other cartels.
12In fact, Norway had no real merger control in 1968. The first formal law dealing with competi-
tion policy in Norway was the “trustlaw” approved in 1926. In 1932 Norway passed an extension to
the “trustlaw” that allowed authorities to cartelize industries by law. In addition, the 1932 exten-
sion outlawed excessively low prices in order to “prevent excessively low profitability in the industry”.
Consumer interests were practically irrelevant and this cartel-friendly practice continued up to world
war I (Nordvik, 1995). In 1953 Norway issued a new law on competition — the so-called price law.
The law stated very general objectives on competition issues, but once again the authorities practice
was quite cartel friendly. Due to lack of resources the authorities who were responsible at the time
(the “Prisdirektoratet”) did not really focus on the analysis of markets (Halvorsen and Undrum, 1995).
Interestingly enough the authorities themselves concluded as late as in 1982 that the “price law from
1960 did not warrant cartel control”. However during the 80’s the political views changed and merger
control was introduced in Norway by 1988.
13We have searched through old newspapers from that time and found no indications that large
customers were opposed to the merger in 1968.
14In the following three annual reports we can find similar statements: “In addition CPC supplied
73 000 tonnes in 1965, against 54 000 in 1964, by way of indirect export to DPC’s customers” (1965
report, pp. 13-14), “The deliveries in 1966 went up to 580 000 tonnes, inclusive an indirect export of
70 000 tonnes” (1966 report, p.13), and finally: “In 1967 it was exported 632 000 tonnes. Our company
[CPC] has indirectely taken part in this export operation by delivering cement to DPC’s domestic area”
(1967 report, p.15).
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We have already mentioned the German cement cartel of the 1920s and 1930s. Another
example is the domestic cartels in Japan, which allocated quotas according to relative
capacity, led to excess capacity in many Japanese industries during the 50s and 60s [see
Matsui (1989)].
Another prominent case of a cartel that divided the market according to production
capacity is the so-called Lysine cartel that operated in the period 1992-95. According
to Griﬃn (2001) the cartel members typically met late in the year in order to determine
how much each producer had sold in the preceding year. The members then proceeded
by estimating the market growth for the upcoming year and allocated the growth among
themselves. On the other hand, the Lysine cartel did not have an incentive problem,
because they did not set their domestic quotas based on total capacities. Instead it was
an international cartel 15. They also did not have a common distribution system.
The most recent examples of production sharing rules are found in the agricultural co-
operatives (Bergman, 1997). The US had 5800 farm marketing and supply cooperatives
in 1986 (Sexton, 1986). According to Bergman there were 4536 primary cooperatives just
in Germany in 1997. Similar arrangements are found in many other European countries.
Typically cooperatives purchase whatever their members have been able to produce, and
then decide how much to sell at home. The rest is sold (often at much lower prices) on
world markets. Since the cooperatives usually cannot restrict their members production,
the incentive structure is analogous to our set-up.16
There are, of course, other sharing rules, most notably geographic market segmenta-
tion. An example of this is the so-called marine construction and transportation cartel,
where the conspirators reached an agreement to allocate customers and agree on pricing
heavy-lift derrick barge and related marine construction services in the major oil and
gas production regions of the world17. Two firms owned all (six) heavy-lifter derricks
in the world. In 1997 the two firms (and one of the firm’s subsidiaries) were accused of
regional market sharing and price fixing.
Geographic sharing rules have other incentive problems than the one studied in this
15The volume allocation agreement then became the basis for an annual “budget” for the cartel, a
reporting and auditing function and a compensation scheme (Griﬃn, 2001).
16In several countries as (e.g., Denmark, Finland, Sweden, France, Germany and Netherlands) agricul-
tural marketing cooperatives are explicitly exempt from prohibitions that regulate other firms (Bergman,
1997).
17Heavy-lift derrick barges are floating crane vessels with a capacity to lift heavy structures, such as
the decks of oﬀshore oil platforms, in a marine environment. The conspiracy originally targeted contracts
in the North Sea, but grew to include projects in the Gulf of Mexico and the Far East. Information
on this cartel can be found for instance in the Department of Justice’s press release Monday December
22th 1997, (see http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1997/1325.htm.
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paper, such as when economic growth varies considerably across regions. Since cement
production is observable, it can be measured and the market can easily be divided.
Using production as a sharing rule will ensure that regional diﬀerences in consumption
patterns will eﬀect the individual cartel members’ profitability in a symmetric way.
4 The Model
In this section we specify a simple model to illustrate how the sharing can be used to
identify the eﬀectiveness of the cartel. We model cement as a homogenous good. The
domestic cement industry is characterized by a demand curve, P (QD), where QD is the
domestic quantity and P is the domestic price. We assume that the world market for
cement is perfectly competitive, with the world market price exogenously given by R.
Finally, we assume that P (0) > R and that there are no imports.
There are N domestic firms, which operate a legal cartel. The cartel decides on the
total amount of domestically sold cement, QD and on a sharing rule. In our case, the
Norwegian cartel decided on a sharing rule that appears to be rather reasonable from the
cartel’s point of view: the cartel decides to reward domestic market shares based on the
members share of total Norwegian production (i.e. exports plus domestic sales). Most
importantly, the cartel does not restrict individual capacity decisions18. We therefore
let firms decide on how much capacity to build non-cooperatively.
In terms of timing, we analyze a simple two stage game. In stage one, cartel members
make non-cooperative capacity decisions, anticipating the sharing rule. Denote the ca-
pacity by firm i as qi,where i = 1, .., N . The production sharing rule is then si ≡ qi/
P
qi,
such that si is the domestic market share of firm i. In stage two, the common sales
oﬃce cooperatively allocates the domestic output QD. This implies that siQD is firm
i0s domestic sales, while the remaining output, qi − siQD, is available for exporting.
The profit function of firm i is composed of domestic profits and returns from ex-
porting, and is given by,
πi = P (QD)siQD − cqi +R · (qi − siQD),
where c is the marginal cost of capacity.
The Domestic Allocation Decision (The Common Sales Oﬃce) In stage two,
the common sales oﬃce sets domestic quantity, by max
QD
P
πi. Note that firm’s domestic
sales are proportional to the capacity share - so that firms will agree on the choice of
18Since firms always produce up to capacity, we assume that the marginal production costs of cement
is low enough such that firms’ are capacity constrained.
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industry domestic sales. Assuming that exporting occurs (see below) QD <
P
qi, we
arrive at the following first-order condition for the domestic market allocation,
P 0QD + P −R = 0 (1)
In words, the cartel allocates domestic output by equating marginal revenue in the
domestic market to the world market price. Note that the marginal cost of capacity (c)
does not enter the first-order condition for the domestic market equilibrium. As a result
we can not follow the standard approach and identify marginal costs from equation (1).
We will return to this point below.
By contrast the world market price R enters (1) as it is the opportunity cost of
not exporting. As a result, the world market price plays the usual role of marginal
costs. Implicitly diﬀerentiating (1) it is straightforward to show that ∂QD/∂R < 0.
Accordingly, the lower R, the lower the domestic price. In particular, when R is below
c, the cartels price is below the monopoly price defined by the usual monopoly condition
P 0QM +P − c = 0. In this case, the ineﬀectiveness of the cartel leads to lower domestic
prices and profits19, and two higher domestic consumer surplus.
The previous discussion illustrates that the cartel’s eﬀectiveness to keep prices at
monopoly levels in domestic markets is reduced when R is low. It is interesting to
ask under what conditions the domestic price is equal to a price level that would have
emerged under symmetric Cournot competition. Let qC denote the firms’ symmetric
Cournot output defined by,
P 0qc+P − c = 0. (2)
Prices in a symmetric Cournot game are higher than in the cartel outcome if, c −
P 0(NqC)qC > R − P 0(QD)QD. Using linear demand this can be written as, ((N +
1)/2)(a− R)2 > (a− c)2, where a is the demand intercept. We therefore find that the
cartel is less eﬀective than a non-cooperative domestic Cournot solution (in the sense
of lower domestic equilibrium prices) when R is low, c is high, and when the market
structure is less concentrated (high N). A cartel using a production-based sharing rule
may thus result in even lower domestic prices than a non-cooperative Cournot market.
We will test whether this was the case in Norway in the empirical section below.
As we have seen, the sharing rule induces positive domestic welfare eﬀects. However,
these gains have to be traded-oﬀ against losses in the export markets. The size of this
ineﬃciency will depend on the total amount of capacity that is installed, which is a
19To see the impact of R on domestic profits, implicitly diﬀerentiate the domestic industry profit
function ΠD = PQD − F − cQD, which yields ∂Π/∂R = ∂Q
D
∂R (Q
DP 0 + P − c) which is positive. This
implies that domestic producer surplus will fall with lower world market prices. The intuition for this
result is that when R falls below c, prices get closer to non-cooperative prices.
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function of the incentives to gain a bigger share of domestic profits. We now turn to
capacity decisions.
Firm’s Capacity Decisions In stage one, firms decide on their individual capacity
by solving max
qi
{πi} . The first-order condition is
(1− si)
QD
Q (P −R) +R− c = 0, (3)
where the first term, (1− si)Q
D
Q (P − R), constitutes the incentive to export due to
the sharing rule. Note that if the marginal cost of capacity c is below R for all capacity
levels, then (3) can never be satisfied and capacity investments tend towards infinity. To
concentrate on an interior solution we will assume that c is above R (see below). As a
result the loss in the export market is EL = (Q−QD)(c−R).
We have already seen that the impact of the world market price R on domestic profits
is negative. By contrast, the impact of R on profits in the export market is ambiguous.
Implicit diﬀerentiation yields ∂EL/∂R = ∂(Q−QD)∂R (c − R) − (Q − QD). The first term
is positive, which is the loss from increased exports below costs20. The second term is
negative, which decreases the loss due to the increase in export price R. We thus find
that even though the impact of a higher R on domestic profitability is positive, the eﬀect
on total profitability is ambiguous, while the impact on domestic consumer surplus is
negative.
Overall, we find that a cartel using a production-based sharing rule leads to higher
domestic consumer surplus, but the impact on profitability is ambiguous. This trade-oﬀ
can also be represented graphically. We illustrate the cartel and monopoly equilibrium
in Figure 3. The monopoly outcome is the usual solution where marginal revenue meets
marginal cost, yielding a price Pm and quantity Qm. No export will take place in
monopoly equilibrium, since the world price R is below marginal cost of capacity. The
cartel solution is the price-quantity combination (P cart, Qcart) where marginal revenue
equals R. Exports are given by the diﬀerence between total domestic production, Q,
and the domestic quantity sold Qcart. The change in consumer surplus by moving from
cartel to monopoly is therefore given by the sum of the areas A and C. The impact
on producer surplus is given by A minus B plus the saved export loss, D. Finally, the
change in welfare is D-B-C, which is ambiguous.
20Implicit diﬀerentiation of (3), yields after some manipulation that ∂(Q−Q
D)
∂R > 0. That is firms
export more whenever R increases.
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[Figure 3 approximately here]
Given that the eﬀectiveness (in terms of cartel profitability) of the Norwegian cement
cartel is in theory ambiguous, we now turn to the data in an attempt to evaluate the
trade-oﬀ empirically.
5 Empirical Implementation
As is often the case in empirical studies of market behavior, one does not have reliable
data for marginal costs. Marginal costs are then inferred through equilibrium behavior
(usually through a first-order condition such as equation(2)), provided that an estimate
of demand is available. For example, estimation of both the monopoly and the Cournot
equilibrium (such as (2)) would need to proceed in this fashion.
The lack of data on marginal costs is no diﬀerent in the case of the Norwegian cement
industry. However, in our case we can use the institutional set-up of the sharing rule
to identify marginal cost, even without estimating demand. To see this, consider the
first-order condition for capacity choices by firms (3). Since there is excess capacity,
capacity choices by individual cartel members do not aﬀect the domestic allocations by
the common sales oﬃce (see (1)). As a result, domestic demand conditions are irrelevant
for the capacity choices and we can identify marginal costs without demand estimation
from (3).
Our identification of marginal costs rests on the existence of the cartel’s sharing rule,
which produces an incentive to export. We will test this assumption below by checking
whether exporting takes place in equilibrium.
5.1 Demand
While marginal costs are not needed for the estimation of the domestic market equi-
librium (1)21, we do need an estimate of demand. In this section we estimate demand
using data from both the cartel period, as well as the monopoly period resulting from
the domestic merger. We estimate the demand by instrumental variables using data
from both periods, that is we assume that the structure of domestic demand has been
stable over this time period. Given the homogeneity of cement we use the following
Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ADL) formulation for demand,
Pt = β0 + βQDQDt + βQD1QDt−1 + βZZt + βZ1Zt−1 + γPt−1 + εt (4)
21Recall, however, that both the monopoly and the Cournot equilibrium need an estimate of marginal
costs of capacity, as well as demand. This is the usual model, i.e. a market without the sharing rule.
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where Z is an exogenous variable aﬀecting domestic demand of cement. We use
the Norwegian construction and building index (BC) as a Z variable and various other
cost shifters as instruments.22 The data and summary statistics are presented in Table
1 (see Appendix A for detailed information on data sources and variable definitions).
Specification (4) is an ADL(1,1) specification. The most common motivation for using
this framework is the importance of accounting for short-run dynamics in the data.
Short-run deviations may be caused by factors such as random shocks, sticky prices,
contracts etc. By including lagged observations of the endogenous variables, the ADL
framework also incorporates dynamic factors such as habit formation. The presence of
habit formation in demand make static models inadequate (Pollak and Wales, 1992).
In addition to accounting for short run dynamics, the ADL model yields both a short-
and long run demand elasticities. The short run demand elasticity is ESRPP = 1βQD
QD
P ,
while the long run elasticity is given by ELRPP = 1−γβQD+βQD1
QD
P through the steady state
solution (i.e. Pt = Pt−1 and QDt = QDt−1). The ADL model also provides an estimate of
the speed of adjustment (1− γ) which is normalized to lie between 0 and 1.
[Tables 1 and 2 approximately here]
The results for demand estimation are presented in Table 2. The model shows no
signs of autocorrelation; the Box-Pierce test statistics is low, indicating no first order
or higher order autocorrelation (see Q1 and Q4 in Table 1). The adj. R2 is 43%. The
short run elasticity is estimated to be -0.46, implying an inelastic demand in the short
run. The long run elasticity is estimated at -1.47. This is in line with intuition, as
other materials like wood and metal can be substituted for cement in the long run. The
adjustment speed is estimated at 0.46, which implies that 46% of a short run shock is
absorbed each year. Both the relatively large diﬀerence between short run and long run
elasticities, as well as the relatively low adjustment speed are reasonable for the cement
industry. Most larger construction contracts will be longer than one year. Hence, within
a year there is relatively little scope for adjustment, whereas between years this scope
increases substantially; new contracts can be negotiated and other building materials
chosen.
22A posibble concern with using BC as an exogenous variable is its potential endogeneity with cement
quantity and prices. However, the gross output of the cement industry has less than 1% weight in the
BC index, e.g., in 1960 the weight was 0.8%. The exogeneity of cost shifters is given by the fact that
production is not directly determined by costs (see equation (1)).
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5.2 Marginal Costs and Consistency
As discussed, given the institutional set-up and the sharing rule, we are able to identify
marginal costs from (3) as
c = (1− si)
QD
Q (P −R) +R (5)
As is the case in all empirical studies that use equilibrium concepts to identify mar-
ginal costs, we depend on the correct specification of (5).
In order to test our approach, we provide two consistency checks. The first one is
based on c > R, which needs to be satisfies for our model to make sense. Figure 4 plots
the predicted marginal capacity costs (c), the world market price (R), as well as the
domestic price (P ). As can be seen, marginal capacity costs are always above the world
market price implying that the data are consistent with our maintained assumption.
[Figure 4 approximately here]
A further important consistency check of our structural approach is based on a
comparison between the predicted marginal costs via the equilibrium condition (5) and
other information on cost accounting data. Figure 5 plots three input price series -
electricity and fuel, wages, as well as materials - based on accounting data sources (see
Appendix A for details) as well as our predicted marginal cost. As can be seen, except for
a jump in the electricity and fuel costs in 1967 when also the predicted marginal cost has
a small increase, the accounting cost data information and our (equilibrium) marginal
cost are remarkably similar. The simple correlation between our inferred measure of
marginal cost and the input factors are 0.93 (electricity and fuel), 0.89 (wage) and 0.82
(materials), respectively.
An alternative is to aggregate the three input factors into an average unit cost per
ton of cement. The comparison of the aggregate unit cost index is given in Figure 6.
Again, one can see that the (short run) average unit cost measure is highly correlated
with our marginal cost measure derived from the first order condition (the correlation is
now 0.96). It is worth noting that our measure of marginal cost is a long-run measure,
i.e. it includes capacity, which is why the marginal cost line is above the average unit
cost measure in Figure 6.
In sum, we find that information on accounting cost data is consistent with our
equilibrium measure of marginal costs, lending considerable credibility to our approach.
[Figures 5 and 6 approximately here]
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5.3 Welfare Analysis
Using our demand and cost estimates we are able to perform a complete welfare analysis.
In order to analyze the impact of the cartel we first compare the cartel situation to
that of a monopoly. In doing so, we use the long run demand estimates given by











compute the monopoly equilibrium. Figure 7 compares moving from the cartel to a
monopoly equilibrium for each of the years 1955 to 1968.
As can be seen in Figure 7, the cartel is not eﬀective at all. In particular, losses from
exporting are very large. Apparently, the sharing rule creates a considerable incentive
problem, leading to significant overproduction and exporting below marginal costs.23
By contrast, the losses in the domestic market are substantially lower, indicating that
the common sales oﬃce is rather eﬀective in keeping domestic prices close to monopoly
levels.
As a consequence of the sharing rule, domestic consumers are better oﬀ under the
cartel relative to a monopoly. The cartel’s ineﬀectiveness is to the benefit of consumers.
Figure 7 also shows that the eﬀectiveness of the cartel is declining dramatically over
time, as the incentive problem is becoming more and more of a problem for the cartel.
Interestingly, the cartel was operating so ineﬃciently around 1967 that a merger to
monopoly actually had a positive eﬀect on welfare. The loss from exporting is so large
that the gains to consumers are outweighed, resulting in positive domestic welfare from
a merger to monopoly.
[Figure 7 approximately here]
Insofar our results suggest that the timing of the merger took place exactly at the
right time, i.e. when a benevolent domestic dictator would have merged. Given the
likely absence of benevolent dictators in Norway, one may wonder why the merger took
place in exactly 1968, i.e. exactly when the net benefit of consumers and firms becomes
positive. As already discussed in Section 2, a reasonable explanation are the existence
of other institutional agreements that have been agreed on a long-term basis. As losses
from exporting where mounting up and other agreements were running out in 1968, a
merger to monopoly was ultimately implemented. Another factor allowing a merger to
monopoly in 1968 was that antitrust concerns vis-à-vis the merger were unlikely to be
significant in Norway at that time.
23These patterns are consistent with what we find in other agricultural cooperatives. Members of
the cooperatives would be even better oﬀ if they reduced capacities and sold less at home and prevent
costly export. However, the monopoly price at home compensate enough to make them better oﬀ than
the alternative of competition.
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The previous findings suggest that the merger took place exactly at the optimal
time for welfare. However, this conclusion is premature, as it ignores the possibility of
competition. Table 3 presents the comparison with Cournot competition for the year
1968, as well as the accumulated rents over the sample period 1955-1968.
[Table 3 approximately here]
As can be seen in Table 3, domestic consumers would have benefited from Cournot
competition, i.e. the cartel is not as ineﬀective that it drives domestic prices down to
non-cooperative levels. On the other hand, competition would have lowered producer
surplus. In other words, competition is first-best for consumers and the worst market
outcome for firms. In terms of welfare, however, it is clear that Cournot competition is
best.
In light of this, the wisdom of the merger to monopoly in 1968 has to be reassessed.
The merger may have come at the right time, but only if the alternative is to do nothing
(i.e. keep the cartel in place). If the alternative is to move to competition, neither cartel
nor merger to monopoly have been to the benefit of Norwegian welfare. In other words,
a well functioning competition policy authority would have broken up the cartel and not
allowed the merger to monopoly (recall that at the time there was none, however).
Table 3 also reports estimates for the welfare loss due to this apparent public policy
failure. In 1968 alone the welfare gain from breaking up the cartel in favor of competition
is some 131 million NOK, while the merger to monopoly increases welfare by only 11
million NOK. In other words, the apparent welfare enhancing merger to monopoly, left
120 million NOK ”on the table” by not allowing competition. In this sense the merger
to monopoly was a distant second best solution. The picture is even more dramatic with
regard to consumers. While domestic consumers lose from the merger (some 37 million
NOK, see Table 3 again), our model suggests that they would benefit 237 million NOK
from competition in 1968 alone.
Table 3 also reports on the accumulated rents. As can be seen, the accumulated
domestic welfare from moving from cartel to merger already in 1995 is negative (some
96 million NOK), which implies that a merger in 1955 would have not been desirable
from a Norwegian point of view, if the alternative is to keep the cartel. If, however,
the alternative is competition, then a break-up of the cartel in 1955 would have resulted
in a welfare gain to Norway of some 799 million NOK (with some 1.5 billion NOK in
benefits to the Norwegian consumers).
In sum, we find that relative to keeping the cartel in place, the merger to monopoly
in 1968 was exactly what a benevolent dictator would have done. However, the picture
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is rather diﬀerent, if the alternative is competition. In this case, the Norwegian cement
industry is subject to a considerable public policy failure.
6 Conclusion
Using a unique institutional set-up in the Norwegian cement industry, we are able to
study the workings of a cartel in detail. We focus on the cartel’s eﬃciency and in partic-
ular its sharing rule, which is commonly used in other cartels. Taking these institutional
factors into account, we focus on the two problems that the cartel faces: deciding on the
domestic quantity as well as on the distribution of rents. Given data on domestic and
world market prices, production, and exports, we are able to identify marginal costs, as
well as the eﬀectiveness of the cartel and its impact on consumers and welfare.
We show that the cement cartel has been ineﬃcient by using a ”production” sharing
rule, which creates an incentive to overinvest in capacity and export (below marginal
costs) in order to increase their share of a profitable domestic market. We have shown
that this sharing rule benefits consumers (relative to outright monopoly pricing), while
producers are losing both domestically as well as in the export market.
The domestic welfare implications of a merger to monopoly - which are in theory
ambiguous - are empirically shown to become positive at exactly the time of the merger,
i.e. in 1968. We thus find that relative to keeping the cartel in place, the merger to
monopoly in 1968 was exactly what a benevolent dictator would have done. However,
the picture is rather diﬀerent, if the alternative of competition is included. In this case,
the Norwegian cement industry is subject to a considerable public policy failure.
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Appendix A: Data Description, Sources and Construction
The data is collected from four main sources; the Norwegian Industry Statistics (NIS),
the Norwegian Trade Statistics (NTS), the Norwegian Historical Statistics (NHS), and
the National Accounts Statistics (NAS), all published annually by the (Central Bureau
of) Statistics Norway (SSB).
The Norwegian export figures are from NTS, containing the commodity numbers:
35.22, 25.23 and 2523.1000. Production and export are measured in tonnes and the
export price (R) is the unit price measured as NOK per ton. The latter is calculated
as the yearly export value divided by the yearly export quantity. The European export
figures are from CEMBUREAU’s production, trade and consumption statistics; «World
Cement Market in Figures 1913-1981», World Statistical Review No.4, and yearly CEM-
BUREAU publications from 1982.
The cost observations are from NIS; ISIC code 3340 prior to 1970 and ISIC code
3692 from 1970 onwards. The instruments used in the demand equation are labor price
which is labor expenses per man year, the material price which is calculated as material
expenses per ton produced, and the electricity & fuel price which is also a per ton price.
(Note that in Figure 5 is labor cost calculated as a per ton price to be directly comparable
to derived marginal cost).
Yearly production is also found in NIS, but is checked against production figures
provided by Norcem, and production figures from CEMBUREAU.
The export price, and the three cost measures are all deflated using the Norwegian
Consumer Price Index (CPI), which is found in NAS and NHS.
The construction index we use as a measure of market size is a volume index of
gross domestic product in the construction industry. It is derived from NOS National
Accounts Statistics [National Accounts 1865 - 1960 (Table 45), Historical Statistics 1968
and 1984]. Data for the various time periods are spliced by the simple ratio method
to form a consistent time series. The index is collected and constructed by Jan Tore
Klovland, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration.
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Table 1 Summary Statistics for the main variables and the cost shifters for the period 1955 to 
1982. (All values are deflated using the Norwegian CPI [1985=100] measured in NOK, costs 
are measured per ton, and wages are measured per man year. Quantity figures are measured in 
tonnes.)  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
R 316.12 89.469 227.54 524.42 
P 524.44 106.944 359.08 706.29 
Z 1597.99 419.370 1108.39 2319.92 
QD 1393830 294242.4 799078 1795089 
Production 1911776 651611.2 799878 2740169 
Export 517946 402138.8 800 1217277 
Price Materials 125.43 43.023 63.37 208.38 
Price Electricity & Fuel 98.34 41.869 50.06 185.82 





Two stage least squares estimates of demand 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
QDt -8.13E-04** (3.61E-04) 
CBt -0.212 (0.315) 
Pt-1 0.543** (0.265) 
QDt-1 6.98E-04** (3.11E-04) 
CBt-1 0.347 (0.308) 
CONST 224.330 (151.100) 
   
Adj.-R2 0.432  
Q1 1.020  
Q4 4.400  
   
EPPSR -0.455**  
EPPLR -1.468  
   
Adjustment speed 0.457* (0.265) 






Impact on Producer Surplus, Consumer Surplus, and Welfare (1000 NOK).  
 1968 Accumulated 
1955 to 1968 
Cartel to Competition   
   
Producer surplus -106 797    -668 521  
Consumer surplus  237 350  1 467 765 
Net Welfare Effect  130 553     799 244  
 
Cartel to Monopoly 
 
   
Producer surplus  47 891  189 032 
Consumer surplus -36 760 -285 157  




Figure 1  
The development in Norwegian cement production and consumption in the period  
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Consistency of predicted marginal Cost: Comparison of  domestic price, export price and 

































The development in the marginal cost predicted from the models first order conditions and the 



































The development in the marginal cost predicted from the models first order conditions and the 
development in short run average costs (AC) from data for the period 1955 to 1968 (wage, 
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